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Difficult Dialogue: 
The Oslo Process in Israeli Perspective
Avraham Sela
I. Preface
The Oslo Accords seemed to represent the new post-Cold War/
post-Gulf War era, which ostensibly heralded the beginning of a “new 
world order” under American hegemony. The weakened Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Arab radical actors, such as Syria 
and Iraq; the belief that the American-led capitalist, market-oriented 
ideology had scored its final victory—best expressed by Francis Fuku-
yama’s “End of History” thesis; Israel’s vulnerability to Iraq’s medium-
range missiles and to American financial pressures; and the perceived 
loss of Israel’s status as a reliable U.S. ally in a tumultuous Middle East 
all seemed to have created ripe conditions for a historical breakthrough 
in the long-stalemated Arab-Israeli peace process.
Indeed, the first two years following the signing of the Oslo Accords 
were especially marked by international optimism, together with a 
growing temptation to foresee a “new Middle East,” characterized by 
joint economic ventures, development projects, and social coopera-
tion, on both regional and Israeli-Palestinian levels. During this period, 
Israel and the PLO seemed determined to cement their partnership: 
implementing the Gaza-Jericho phase, signing the Paris Economic Pro-
tocol which defined their economic relations, and signing the Oslo II 
Accord by which Israel would withdraw from all Palestinian cities, 
thus transferring responsibility for most of the Palestinians in the West 
Bank, in addition to Gaza, into the hands of the Palestinian Authority 
(PA).
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This discernible progress, however, could hardly blur the signifi-
cance of formidable obstacles, first and foremost the internal opposi-
tion, with which the leaders on both sides had to cope in the process 
of implementation of the agreement. Despite the initial support of the 
majority of Israelis and Palestinians for the Oslo Accords and for a 
two-state solution, the factors striving to “U-Turn” the process became 
increasingly determined to wreck the ship before it reached a safe 
shore. The Taba Agreement (Oslo II) of September 1995, which signi-
fied Israel’s determination to make tangible concessions toward the 
implementation of the Oslo Accords, and, seemingly, the realization of 
Palestinian statehood alarmed the zealot opponents of the Oslo process 
and convinced them to take decisive actions to put an end to it. The 
new agreement collided head-on with core nationalist beliefs of the 
Israeli right wing, risking not only the surrender of the West Bank—the 
cradle of biblical Israeli nationhood—but also the division of historic 
Palestine, thus burying the dream of the “Greater Land of Israel.” Simi-
larly, it threatened the Palestinian Islamic creed of historic Palestine 
from the “sea to the river” as an indivisible sacred unit for the Muslims 
until the Day of Judgment.1
The means that the Israeli right wing and the Islamic Jihadist groups 
employed to undermine the Oslo process were indeed different in 
nature and direction, but in effect they perfectly complemented each 
other’s actions and jointly contributed to the escalating tensions and 
return to confrontation. The assassination of Prime Minister Rabin on 4 
November 1995 did not prevent the implementation of the Taba Agree-
ment,2 and in January 1996, the first free elections for the Palestinian 
Legislative Council and Chairman of the PA were held in the West 
Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. These events, however, trig-
gered both local and regional Arab militant opponents to escalate their 
violent efforts against the process, thus deepening the doubts and fears 
among Israelis concerning further concessions to the Palestinians. It 
also led to the election of a right-wing government headed by Benja-
min Netanyahu, a devout opponent of the Oslo Accords, whose term 
in office would be perceived by Palestinian and Arab negotiators as 
dealing a death blow to the peace process.3
What began with a sense of elevated idealistic hopes and eupho-
ria thus turned into a crisis of expectations and mistrust, resulting 
in a dangerous stalemate and then a major eruption of violence in 
October 1996. The collapse of the joint bilateral venture could not be 
better illustrated than by the resort of the parties to a new model 
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of negotiations mediated by the American administration, instead of 
hitherto direct ones. Growing concerns of the Israeli public over secu-
rity—mainly in its individual meaning—in addition to the ideological 
inhibitions, became a primary consideration in shaping Israeli policy-
making toward the Palestinian “other,” regardless of the government’s 
ideology. Finally, the culmination of the stalemate by the breakdown 
of the Camp David summit in July 2000 represented a major crisis of 
expectations on Israel’s as well as on the Palestinians’ part, leading to 
an unprecedented scope, span of time, and intensity of violence and 
counter-violence between the two communities.
Embodied by the long and costly al-Aqsa Intifada of the Palestin-
ians against Israel, and the repeated failures to forge a sustainable 
cease-fire between these bleeding societies before returning to nego-
tiations, this crisis may almost have entirely buried the possibility of a 
negotiated settlement between them. What these “lost years” and their 
cumulative political, social, and psychological residues caused seems 
to be even more acute: apathy, indifference, and apparent acquies-
cence in the continuing stalemate. Worse yet, there has been a growing 
despair for a two-state solution. Instead, there is a reconsideration, if 
not adherence—even among exemplary Palestinian advocates of the 
two-state solution—to the idea of a one-state solution based on equal 
rights between Jews and Palestinians,4 which is an idea the vast major-
ity of Israelis perceives as tantamount to a call for eliminating Israel as 
a Jewish state.5
Fifteen years after the euphoric days at the signing of the Oslo 
Accords, Israelis and Palestinians seem to have acquiesced in the stale-
mated status quo and have lost hope for an historical compromise 
in the foreseeable future. Notwithstanding the continued dialogue 
between top Israeli and Palestinian leaders; despite the American 
efforts—as indecisive as they were6—to inject new life into the Oslo 
process via presidential visions, such as the “Road Map” of June 2002 
and the Annapolis Declaration of November 2007; and despite the 
efforts of the international Quartet (the U.N., Russia, the EU, and the 
U.S.) to see to the implementation of the Road Map, it is the cycle of 
violence and counter-violence, reactive rather than proactive policies, 
and mostly chaotic domestic politics set by ideologically divided soci-
eties and weak authorities that determined the course of events that 
led to this deadlock.
The collapse of the Oslo process is also represented by the need of 
each of the parties to justify its decisions and behavior while rolling 
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the blame for the failure of the once internationally cherished joint 
project into the other’s court. The narratives developed by Israelis and 
Palestinians alike offered each party and group the desired explana-
tions to the existing stalemate and continued low-intensity conflict. As 
such, these narratives provide a sense of validity to, and resonate with, 
people’s lives, or are deemed a self-fulfilling prophecy. The stories of 
the recent past thus become another layer in the parties’ accumulated 
historical narratives shaping the upbringing of new generations and, 
hence, constitute another obstacle for future conflict resolution.
Against this backdrop a balanced and studied retrospective expla-
nation of what went wrong in the Oslo process is much needed. Rather 
than weighing Israeli and Palestinian relative responsibility for the 
deadlocked Oslo process, this essay scrutinizes the pathologies of this 
protracted conflict mainly through the Israeli perspective and conduct 
during the Oslo years.7
Much of the trouble undergone by the Oslo process and the crises 
that had befallen it can be explained in terms of two main clusters of 
reasons:
•  The inadequate “ripeness” of the parties involved for an agreed-
upon permanent settlement of their historic conflict and commit-
ment to see to its implementation.
•  The structure, rationale, and stipulations of the initial accord of 13 
September 1993.
In addition—and partly interrelated with the problem of ripeness—
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process suffers from serious structural 
barriers at both the domestic and regional levels, all of which were 
represented in the Oslo process. Moreover, unlike inter-state efforts for 
conflict resolution, and despite the fact that the state of Israel was the 
primary party in it, due to the geopolitics of the conflict and the distri-
bution of Jewish and Arab populations between the Jordan River and 
the Mediterranean, the Oslo process must be understood in the context 
of ethnic conflict resolution, which tends to be extremely complicated 
and thus rarely successful.8 It is around these structural factors and the 
question of ripeness that this essay revolves.
This essay begins with representations of contending narratives of 
Israelis and Palestinians, practitioners and scholars, explaining what 
went wrong. The next section examines the state of ripeness as far as 
Israel was concerned, followed by an in-depth analysis of the structural 
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causes that played a spoiling role in the Oslo process. This section is 
divided into endogenous and exogenous factors. The endogenous factors 
refer mainly to the flaws built into the formal Oslo Accords, namely, 
the envisioned structure of the process—including phases, timetable, 
mutuality, clarity, binding conditions, and third-party involvement.
The exogenous factors concern the social and political environment, 
actors and processes, discrepancies of power between the protago-
nists, and the impact of state and non-state actors at both regional and 
international levels. This part also addresses the role of competing 
ideologies and collective identities in shaping the parties’ behaviors 
and political legitimacy for implementing unpopular political compro-
mises. Finally, the article looks into the impact of the violent conflict 
during the al-Aqsa Intifada on Israel’s social, cognitive, and political 
behavior. By briefly examining the impact of the al-Aqsa Intifada on 
Israel’s responses, I intend to further identify blockages standing in 
the way of current or future attempts to bring about a settlement of the 
conflict.
II. Who’s Fault?: Contending Narratives of Failure
Though the causes for the collapse of the Oslo process, especially in 
view of its early hopeful stages, have since been debated by practi-
tioners and scholars alike, they remain diverse and often represent 
political inclinations.9 Indeed, Israeli and Palestinian narratives about 
the Oslo process, defined by an Israeli scholar as “Rashomon,”10 rep-
resent a typical case of contentious politics waged within each of the 
parties concerned, as well as between them, and shared by formal and 
informal institutions and social movements.11 The intuitive response 
of many, if not most, Israelis to the question “what went wrong?” with 
the Oslo process would project the blame on the “other,” both external 
and internal players, though their relative shares of responsibility are 
by no means equal.
The explanations provided by the Israeli echelons directly involved 
in the negotiations at various levels were quite diverse in their assign-
ment of responsibility for the final collapse of the Oslo process and in 
relation to the obstacles produced along the road. As far as public opin-
ion is concerned, with the massive wave of suicide bombings in Febru-
ary–March 1996, the Israeli public grew mistrustful and apprehensive 
as to the “true” intentions of the Palestinian leadership, nurtured by a 
competitive media inflating the echoes of anti-civilian terrorist attacks. 
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It was only after the breakup of the al-Aqsa Intifada, however, that the 
majority of Israelis, including segments of the left, turned to blame 
Arafat for the failure of the Camp David summit and the indiscrimi-
nate terrorism against Israeli civilians. In this narrative, he bore the 
brunt of the responsibility for the failure of the Oslo process.12
Indeed, Israel’s main complaints in the 1990s focused on the Pales-
tinian terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens and the PA’s reluctance 
or inability to prevent such activities, in violation of Arafat’s commit-
ments in the agreement. Yet within the Israeli political system, views 
differed concerning the necessary linkage between a cease of violence 
by the Palestinians and continuous negotiations with them. With the 
al-Aqsa Intifada, however, right-wing claims against the process were 
ostensibly vindicated, leading to a more assertive anti-Oslo discourse 
supported by politicians and top military officers. The new discourse 
aimed at interpreting the uprising as another phase in a pre-planned 
program of the Palestinian national movement’s war against the very 
existence of the Jewish state. Commentators pointed to the PA’s text-
books issued in 2000 as an example of instilling hostility in the young 
generation instead of fostering a spirit of peace with Israel. Despite dis-
agreements among Israeli experts over the new Palestinian textbooks, 
these claims succeeded in framing the PA as a direct continuation of the 
pre-Oslo PLO rather than as a peaceful partner of Israel.13 According to 
this approach, the Oslo Accords were nothing but a Trojan Horse—a 
major PLO deception aimed at wrecking Israel’s fundamentals from 
within by systematic terrorism, now defined as a “strategic threat” to 
Israel.14
Consequently, those Israelis involved in the Oslo process were 
charged with deluding themselves as a result of ideological disori-
entation, loss of vision, or eagerness to “score points” in Western—
especially EU—circles.15 Politically, the continuous Palestinian terrorist 
attacks against Israeli civilians dealt a severe blow to the Israeli left and 
to the Labor Party that had espoused the Oslo process. By default, the 
Intifada bolstered the hardliner activist approach toward the Palestin-
ians, giving the military a free hand more than ever before to employ 
armed force against Palestinian citizens and armed men alike.
A similar distribution of incriminations was manifest among the 
Palestinians. The breakdown of the Camp David summit and the erup-
tion of violence thereafter seemed to vindicate the critique leveled all 
along at Arafat and his aides by the Islamic movements and ultra-
radical leftist factions for accepting the humiliating conditions of the 
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Oslo agreement. One of the systematic and eloquent critics of the Oslo 
agreement was Edward Said, who, from the outset, held on to the view 
that the agreement and its offshoots were disastrous and inherently 
flawed, placing the brunt of responsibility on the American adminis-
tration, the continued Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, 
and the “Arafatian autocracy,” with its ineptitude and subservience to 
the Israeli government. According to Said, Israeli leaders, including 
Rabin and Peres, had never intended to promote Palestinian self-deter-
mination and statehood, but to perpetuate Israel’s rule over the Pales-
tinian territories, confining their autonomy to municipal matters.16
A more balanced approach is offered by the studies and polemical 
literature that developed following the eruption of the al-Aqsa Intifada 
and the collapse of the Oslo process. Indeed, just as the surprising 
attainment of the Oslo Accords became a central case in peace studies, 
so did the collapse of the Oslo process in early 2001. The intensified 
violence of the al-Aqsa Intifada motivate scholars and practitioners 
alike to inquire as to the causes of the failure of what once seemed a 
historic opportunity to resolve one of the longest, most tenacious and 
complex conflicts on earth.17 Many of the studies, however, focus on 
the gaps between the parties’ positions and their current politics, with 
only limited historical perspective. Or they fail to examine the Oslo 
process through the theoretical literature on conflict resolution, which 
has seen immense development since the end of the Cold War.
III. Insufficient Ripeness
To what extent were the Israeli and Palestinian communities ripe for 
undertaking painful compromises and seeing to their implementation 
when their leaders signed the Oslo Accords? To what extent did Israeli 
and Palestinian policymakers exercise political legitimacy within their 
own constituencies? Moreover, to what extent have they been ready to 
deepen and expand the “official” peace by follow-up activities aimed 
at building social, economic, and psychological bases for a “culture of 
peace?”18 Have they sought to bolster and perpetuate a peaceful rela-
tionship by encouraging grassroots social and economic cooperation, 
revising images and perceptions of self and other—“de-victimization” 
of self and “de-demonization” of the other—and seeking reconciliation 
through reformed narratives in the media and the educational curricu-
lum? The decade and a half since the 1993 Oslo Accords clearly indi-
cates that the parties have been insufficiently ripe for such far-reaching 
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commitments due to social-psychological cognitive reasons rooted in 
their separate yet joint histories from time immemorial.
The concept of ripeness19 is concerned with identifying the most 
appropriate timing for shifting from conflict to conflict resolution, 
with or without the help of a third-party mediator. According to this 
concept, the disputants might be ripe for conflict resolution when a 
“mutual hurting stalemate” is being reached and when an accept-
able alternative is in sight. Yet protagonists of this concept admit its 
weaknesses: identified “ripeness” by no means secures the success of 
peacemaking efforts, hence it has little explanatory use and definitely 
cannot be predictive. Nonetheless, the state of ripeness enables third-
party actors to offer enticing opportunities, ranging from mediation to 
economic aid and monitoring the implementation of the settlement. 
Despite the inadequacies of ripeness as a theory, it offers some insights 
and research tools that enable us to better define the conditions that 
make for successful conflict resolution.
The failure of the final status negotiations and consequent resort to 
violence by the Islamic and Fatah movements definitely underlined the 
parties’ unwillingness to abandon violence and resort only to peaceful 
means. At a deeper level, it raises doubts about the protagonists’ level 
of ripeness for a far-reaching and comprehensive settlement as envi-
sioned by the architects of the original accords. Indeed, an examina-
tion of the process as a whole indicates the immense gaps between the 
two parties, as well as political blockages, some of which were already 
apparent in earlier phases of the process.
The progress attained by Israel and the PLO, from signing the Dec-
laration of Principles (DOP) in September 1993 to the Taba Accord 
of September 1995, indeed indicated their willingness to shift from 
hostility to cooperation. In retrospect, however, the Oslo II accords 
embodied the peak of the Oslo achievements, followed by a constant 
deterioration of Israeli-Palestinian relations, growing mutual mistrust, 
and frustration at the other’s conduct. Above all, however, this deterio-
ration was the result of varied levels of political opposition to the Oslo 
process, from total rejection of any deal with the PLO to a pragmatic 
cost-benefit approach prevalent within both Israeli and Palestinian 
constituencies.
Netanyahu’s term as Prime Minister had an especially negative 
impact on the Oslo process, although he signed two agreements with 
the PLO (the Hebron Accord of January 1997 and the Wye Memoran-
dum of October 1998), thus practically legitimizing the Oslo Accords, 
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albeit grudgingly. Yet these agreements, by which Israel ceded to the 
PA small chunks of land in the West Bank, were effectively redundant, 
resulting from Netanyahu’s retreat from the original Oslo Accords by 
insisting on strict implementation of their own commitments, espe-
cially on security matters. Adopting a tougher line toward the PA and 
raising the cost for any further Israeli compromise was tantamount to a 
retreat from his predecessors’ commitments to further redeployments 
and final status negotiations. It soon resulted in a state of crisis neces-
sitating ever more American go-between inputs. Indeed, these two 
accords were effectively attained thanks to intensive American media-
tion and pressure on both Israeli and PLO leaders by the U.S. president 
himself, unprecedented since President Jimmy Carter’s personal role 
in the Israel-Egypt peace process. That Netanyahu could not fulfill all 
his commitments to the Wye Memorandum and consequently lost his 
Premiership clearly attested to the limited support he could secure 
within his right-wing coalition, despite his tougher policies.
Examining the Oslo process along these lines and others, it seems 
that it was the first Intifada (begun in December 1987), the Gulf War, 
and the end of the Cold War that accounted for relatively ripe condi-
tions for the resumption of the long-stalemated Middle East peace pro-
cess. First, it was the Intifada that injected new energies into the veins 
of the marginalized PLO following its expulsion from Lebanon in 1982. 
It also put Israeli political and military echelons under unprecedented 
moral and diplomatic international pressures and revealed their inabil-
ity to end the Palestinian rebellion. The Intifada also triggered the 
emergence of a new player in the Palestinian arena in the form of 
Hamas, a militant Islamic-nationalist movement, which increasingly 
challenged the PLO’s status as the “sole legitimate representative of 
the Palestinian people.” By repudiating the PLO’s acceptance of a two-
state solution in the conflict with Israel, Hamas claimed legitimacy in 
succeeding the original combatant PLO and vowed to fight Israel to 
the end, thus tacitly questioning the PLO’s legitimacy. The rapid devel-
opment of Hamas as a popular religious movement added a dimen-
sion of urgency to those Israelis wishing to open a secret dialogue with 
the Palestinians, first with leading figures from Jerusalem and the West 
Bank and then with the PLO.20
It was, however, the end of the Cold War, in conjunction with the 
Gulf War, which framed the scope and timing of the resumed Mid-
dle East peace process. The Madrid conference opened with unprec-
edented international attendance in late October 1991. Indeed, had 
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it not been for the heavy American pressures exerted on the Israeli 
government, it is most doubtful that the conference could take place 
at all. Yet it was this diplomatic arena, coupled with the multilateral 
talks, which enabled a gradual rapprochement between Israel and the 
PLO-guided members of the Palestinian delegation, comprised of West 
Bank and Gaza Strip residents.
It is noteworthy that Israel’s government under Rabin turned to 
direct contacts with the PLO as a matter of need, not of choice—in 
view of futile negotiations with the “inside” Palestinian delegation, 
a narrowed parliamentary coalition, and an unfulfilled commitment 
to reach an agreement on Palestinian self-rule in Judea and Samaria 
within nine months of coming to office. A way out of this deadlock was 
opened in the spring of 1993 after it had become clear that the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip representatives with whom Israel maintained 
negotiations were fully controlled by the PLO, and that an unofficial 
secret diplomatic channel with the latter had reached an advanced 
stage.21 Indeed, the adoption of the PLO as the official partner could 
not be preceded by any preparation of the Israeli public for such a 
dramatic change in Israel’s policy. Hence, the breaking news in late 
August about an agreement between Israel and Arafat’s PLO came as 
a shocking surprise to most Israelis, many of whom perceived Arafat 
as a symbol of evil, bigotry and terrorism. Though this demonized 
image was somewhat mitigated in the 1990s, Arafat was never invited 
to visit Israel—not even to attend Rabin’s funeral—and it was only a 
few days before the eruption of the Intifada that he attended a dinner 
at Prime Minister Barak’s private home, not at his official residence in 
Jerusalem.22
Indeed, from the outset only a slight majority of the Israelis sup-
ported the agreement (smaller than the Palestinian one), matching the 
balance of right and left in the Israeli Knesset. This shaky majority 
proved to be extremely vulnerable and its support of the government’s 
policy was conditional on the process’s success. Under the impact of 
indiscriminate suicide bombings by Palestinian Islamist groups against 
Israeli civilians, the contradiction between political reality and prom-
ises for security and peace became difficult to settle, especially in view 
of the unexpected cost claimed by Palestinian violence. The latter was 
skillfully manipulated by the right wing’s discourse, which played on 
sensitive chords of the Jewish historical memory of persecution and 
insecurity. The right wing continued to hammer their audiences with 
the codes of ethno-religious Jewish (as opposed to Israeli) identity and 
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a commitment to the Land of Israel complete (as opposed to the state 
of Israel). In the campaign over the Land of Israel, Jewish religious 
traditions and authorities were instrumental in delegitimating the gov-
ernment led by Rabin and Peres, paving the way to the first assassina-
tion of a Prime Minister in Israel by a Jewish zealot.23
The negative impact of Palestinian violence on Israeli policymaking 
culminated on 27 November 2000, two months into the al-Aqsa Inti-
fada, when the Knesset passed a bill stating that it must approve any 
territorial concession in Jerusalem by an absolute majority of 61. Given 
the right-left balance of power in the Knesset, Barak would not be able 
to win approval for an accord involving the division of Jerusalem, forc-
ing him to call for new elections. Under the impact of mass Palestinian 
violence, shared this time by Fatah, the new elections brought Ariel 
Sharon to the Prime Minister’s office, indicating the burial of the peace 
process for the years to come.
Unlike the total absence of the military establishment in the nego-
tiations leading to the Oslo Accords, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) 
played a major role in the negotiations on the implementation of the 
Accords, in addition to its role as the legal governing authority of 
the occupied territories. Moreover, by virtue of being in charge of the 
national intelligence estimate and possessing unique capabilities of mil-
itary and political planning, Israeli Prime Ministers were obligated—in 
the case of former Chiefs of Staff Rabin and Barak, even preferred—to 
appoint senior military officers as chief negotiators with the Palestin-
ians. This is not to say that the IDF necessarily played a negative role 
in the negotiations, but that in view of its immense influence and self-
perceived duties and responsibilities, it tended to emphasize matters 
of policing and security, manifest mainly by the intensive employment 
of checkpoints, searches, closures, and the restriction of movement of 
people and goods. The destructive role of the military in the context of 
Israeli-Palestinian relations, however, reached its peak during the first 
months of the al-Aqsa Intifada.
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IV. Endogenous Factors
A. The Inconclusive Oslo Accords
The insufficient ripeness of Israel and the PLO for a comprehensive 
and conclusive peace accord underpinned their approaches and con-
duct before and during the Oslo process. In retrospect, it seems clear 
that the main weakness of the Oslo Accords was its transitory (two-
phase process with five-year interim phase) and inconclusive nature, 
leaving open core issues on which there was a huge gap between 
Palestinian and Israeli positions, expectations, and constraints. To cir-
cumvent this gap, the parties opted for a gradual process to establish a 
self-governing Palestinian Authority, first in Gaza and Jericho and later 
in all major towns in the West Bank. Negotiations on the core issues 
(final status, water resources, Jewish settlements, borders, Jerusalem, 
and Palestinian refugees) were delayed to the permanent status phase, 
which were to begin in May 1996 and finalized in May 1999. In hind-
sight, this envisioned order of progress failed to grasp the tremendous 
aggregate impact of uncontrolled Palestinian violence, repeated delays 
in the implementation of agreed-upon commitments, and soured rela-
tions as a result of unilateral policies on the part of Israel.
The essential uncertainty built into the Oslo process about its very 
ability to progress and reach the final status phase was what drew 
most of the fire from critics, Palestinians and Israelis alike. From a criti-
cal Palestinian viewpoint, Arafat was seen as a collaborator with Israel 
because he had not secured the basic Palestinian claims, primarily 
statehood and sovereignty, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, 
and an end to Israeli settlements.24 In a critical Israeli viewpoint, the 
Oslo process risked emptying Israel’s assets without securing Palestin-
ian consent over the permanent settlement matters.25
Indeed, the signatories themselves were not unaware of the inher-
ent weaknesses built into their agreement, and would have preferred 
a comprehensive agreement, defining clear objectives and timetable. 
Reportedly, following the massacre of Muslim worshipers commit-
ted by a Jewish zealot in the Cave of the Patriarch in February 1994, 
Rabin and Arafat themselves discussed the possibility of abandoning 
the phases according to the Oslo Accords and moving straightforward 
to the permanent settlement. Yet even though Rabin saw the logic of 
such strategy, it was deemed impossible due to domestic politics and 
narrowly based government.26
Avraham Sela
117
Rabin’s perception that the Israeli political system was unprepared 
for negotiations with the PLO over the core issues might have been 
mistaken, albeit a clear admittance of political weakness. It is not clear 
whether Rabin believed Israel and the PLO could reach an agreement 
in the final status negotiations or how he envisioned that agreement, 
although he apparently believed in the possibility of retreating alto-
gether from it in case it did not work.27 This vague approach to Israel’s 
primary concern of national security, apparently shared by Shimon 
Peres, might better explain their preference for a gradual process than 
their sense of political insecurity. The following years demonstrated 
that most Israelis were indeed unprepared to accept the minimum Pal-
estinian claims for full sovereignty and statehood, let alone their claims 
over the Temple Mount (al-haramal-sharif) and the right of return of Pal-
estinian refugees into Israel. Indeed, the Israeli public had neither been 
prepared for an agreement with a hitherto sworn enemy, nor informed 
about the real meaning of the Oslo Accords, which had entailed relin-
quishment of symbolic and religiously significant places as well as 
established concepts of security.
In retrospect, the Israeli public possibly misinterpreted the real 
context and rationale for the Oslo Accords, believing that it would 
guarantee security and peace, due to the euphoric vocabulary vastly 
employed in Israeli, Palestinian, and international discourses about the 
Oslo process.28 Indeed, the vision of a process leading to a two-state 
solution based on Security Council Resolution 242—with Palestinian 
sovereignty and close economic cooperation between the parties—was 
championed by Yossi Beilin and a few others involved in back-channel 
talks that eventually led to the Oslo Accords.29 This concept, however, 
was not accepted by Rabin and Peres, the leading figures in the Israeli 
peace camp. Indeed, their policies in the years that followed their sig-
nature on the Oslo Accords represented a narrowly defined agreement 
on a temporary and transitional process which would preserve Israel’s 
overall control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, keep Jerusalem uni-
fied, and deny the PA any symbol of sovereignty.30 Hence, beyond 
domestic constraints, Israeli policymakers from Rabin to Barak lacked 
a clear vision of a final settlement or the parameters by which such a 
settlement should be worked out, without yet considering the mini-
mum Palestinian claims.
Additionally, the generation-long residue of mistrust toward the 
PLO, and especially its leader and symbol Yasser Arafat, kept Israeli 
leaders uptight and cautious lest any gesture or concession to the Pal-
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estinian partner—from releasing prisoners to easing restrictions on 
the movement of people and goods across the borders to further rede-
ployments—would provide ammunition to their political rivals and 
erode their public support. This approach dictated a measurable prog-
ress conditional on the other party’s “good behavior,” which gradu-
ally discredited Fatah to the Palestinian public. Apart from continued 
unilateral measures taken by Israel in the West Bank and East Jerusa-
lem (primarily the continued construction of Israeli settlements and 
security obstacles to the movement of people and goods), a symbolic 
example of this half-hearted policy was the reluctance to officially meet 
Arafat in Israel, relegating him to border-crossing offices and treating 
him as a high-level agent, not as a full-fledged partner, in the most 
crucial effort toward a settlement of the Middle East conflict. Hence, 
the strictly limited scope and transitory nature of the Oslo Accords 
attested to much deeper constraints, even on the Rabin government, 
concerning the minimal Palestinian claims, namely, a sovereign and 
independent Palestinian state along the 1967 lines of the West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. It was these constraints 
and the absence of a clear vision of a desirable and possible settlement 
that accounted for a hesitant and half-hearted approach to the PLO as 
an equal partner in jointly forging a peaceful settlement.
Within its text, the Oslo Accords indicated that both signatories 
adopted a conflict resolution approach, despite the absence of any 
guiding principles by which the permanent status issues were to be 
resolved. Judged by their policies, however, it seems that under Rabin, 
Peres, and Netanyahu, Israel was in fact seeking conflict management, 
with a vague idea, if any, concerning the final status of the occupied 
territories in the permanent settlement. Only after the election of Barak 
for premiership in May 1999 did Israel turn to conflict resolution. In this 
context it is worth noting that the original autonomy plan, agreed upon 
by PM Menachem Begin at Camp David in 1979, was not perceived by 
Israeli governments as an obstacle to the policy of establishing further 
settlements in the occupied territories. Moreover, Begin clearly meant 
to claim sovereignty over the occupied territories at the end of the five-
year interim period.31 Even after signing the Oslo Accords, Rabin and 
Peres remained adamant about preventing discussion of a Palestinian 
state, and refrained from briefing their aides about their visions of the 
final status.32
In the Sharm al-Sheikh Memorandum, signed by PM Barak and 
Chairman Arafat on 4 September 1999, it was agreed that the two 
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sides would resume permanent status negotiations by February 2000, 
towards reaching a Framework Agreement on a Permanent Status 
(FAPS) in five months (by February 2000) and a Comprehensive Agree-
ment on a Permanent Status (CAPS) within a year of the resumption 
of talks. Even then, however, Israel had not given its consent for Pal-
estinian statehood or showed willingness to apply Resolution 242 to 
the Israeli-Palestinian case (a principle Barak accepted in regard to the 
Syrian case). The extent to which even Israeli policymakers, let alone 
the public, knew where they were heading was also indicated by the 
lack of “red lines” concerning borders. Israeli negotiators began by 
suggesting 65% of the West Bank, then inching up to 91% (plus a 1% 
swap) at the Camp David summit (July 2000), due to the firm Palestin-
ian position claiming no less than 100% of the West Bank territory (or 
an equally quantitative and qualitative swap).
Jerusalem’s future was effectively discussed for the first time in the 
formal negotiations with the Palestinian side.33 PM Barak, who had 
hitherto refused to allow the Israeli delegation to deal with the subject 
(fearing the collapse of his coalition), agreed at Camp David to a divi-
sion of sovereignties in the municipal area of Jerusalem, including the 
Old City, as well as a horizontal division of sovereignty in the Temple 
Mount (al-haram al-sharif), which the Palestinians rejected, insisting 
on full sovereignty over the whole compound. The effect of Barak’s 
unprecedented position on Jerusalem in Israel drew harsh criticism 
from the right wing and, to a lesser extent, also from prominent Israeli 
figures at the center of the political spectrum, including Rabin’s widow, 
Lea.34
The issue of refugees turned out to be another insurmountable 
obstacle at Camp David. Since 1993, the issue seemed to be of second-
ary significance for the PLO leadership. It gave Israel the impression 
that the historic Palestinian claim to the right of return of the refugees 
to their places in Israel proper had been abandoned, only to find out 
that the Palestinian delegation ascribed to it a crucial significance. In 
the final analysis, the postponement of negotiations on the core issues 
to the second stage, that is after establishing the PA and boosting Pal-
estinian expectations, had little or no effect whatsoever on the parties’ 
capability to show more flexibility in trading off assets of a symbolic 
nature.35
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B. The Perils of Power Discrepancy
The built-in flaws of the Oslo Accords were particularly harmful to 
the envisioned process because the Israeli-PLO agreement was signed 
by extremely unequal actors. Israel enjoys an overall control of the 
territories under negotiation. Along with formal discrepancies—their 
different political status, experience, and institutional abilities—the 
immense inequality of the Palestinian and Israeli military and eco-
nomic capabilities has been beyond possible rectification. Notwith-
standing the internationally recognized status of the agreement and 
the immense interest of most nations in its successful implementation, 
the text of the Oslo agreement failed to mitigate the huge Israeli invin-
cibility (e.g., by referring disputed interpretations of the agreements to 
a third-party’s arbitration). Even when the U.S. administration became 
involved in the process as a single third party—often at a presidential 
level—in the wake of the 1996 Tunnel riots, it played the role of facilita-
tor rather than undertaking the role of active mediator.36
In practice, the power discrepancy allowed Israel to conduct a secu-
rity-driven policy toward the Palestinians that was shaped by the mili-
tary and security echelons. Included in this policy were restrictions on 
the movement of people and goods (even within the Palestinian ter-
ritories), curfews, closures, demolition of houses, and collective pun-
ishment, thanks to Israel’s strict military control of these territories 
by land, sea, and air. Israel produced dictates and unilateral decisions 
toward the Palestinian side, such as postponement of agreed-upon 
target dates (especially of further redeployments and the beginning of 
the final status negotiations). It also avoided or prevented the imple-
mentation of mutual commitments, such as the safe passage between 
Gaza and the West Bank, in response to Palestinian violence. Finally, 
Israel created “facts”—roads and settlements—on lands that Palestin-
ians perceived to be theirs.
Indeed, nothing soured the Oslo process more than Israel’s vehe-
ment violation of the spirit of the Oslo Accords by a continued policy 
of settlement in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.37 Under Netan-
yahu, this policy was explained as a necessary means to keep together 
his shaky political coalition. Senior PA officials, however, perceived 
the settlement policy as disastrous to their interests, and equally as 
destructive as Palestinian suicide bombings to Israel.38 The main PA 
response to frustrating unilateral Israeli decisions, especially the con-
struction of settlements (including East Jerusalem), was to unilaterally 
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cease security coordination, or the negotiation process itself, giving a 
green light to the Islamist opposition groups to carry out their suicide 
bombings.39
Similarly, the Paris Protocol signed by Israel and the PLO in April 
1994, which included fiscal and monetary agreements, fell prey to 
the huge discrepancy between the two parties’ economic capacities 
and Israel’s military control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the 
same time, Israel had agreed to informal financial arrangements with 
Chairman Arafat that effectively supported corruption and frustrated 
expectations for transparency concerning the utilization of interna-
tional financial aid and institution building by the PA. Netanyahu’s 
premiership was especially marked by unilateral decisions, the most 
conspicuous of which was the opening in October 1996 of the Hasmo-
nean Tunnel along the Temple Mount’s western wall, which triggered 
massive riots and culminated in a confrontation between the PA’s secu-
rity apparatus and Israeli military forces.
Barak, too, failed to respect the agreed-upon deadline of February 
2000 for concluding the FAPS, mainly because he was busy trying to 
reach an agreement with Syria. To rush the negotiations and bridge 
the differences on key issues with the PLO, Barak pressed for a sum-
mit with Arafat and President Clinton. This decision proved hasty and 
insufficiently prepared, coupled with the loss of Barak’s parliamentary 
majority even before going to Camp David. Yet, despite his far-reach-
ing concessions on borders and Jerusalem, the proposals were rejected 
by Arafat.
From an Israeli viewpoint, the expectations for building mutual 
trust and cooperation were gradually frustrated by the Palestinian con-
duct. Indeed, despite their official recognition of the state of Israel 
and acceptance of the two-state solution along the 1967 lines, the PLO 
leaders failed to convince the Israeli public that they were trustworthy, 
that they meant what they signed, or the truth of their publicly stated 
willingness to live peacefully at Israel’s side and not at its expense. 
Three main reasons combined to create this image of the Palestinian 
partner: its unwillingness to confront the Islamic opposition by force, 
its militant public rhetoric, and the PA’s corrupt economy and political 
system.
Apart from short periods (March–May 1996, 1998), Arafat’s will-
ingness to coordinate security policy with Israel fell short of Israel’s 
expectations, being either insufficient or inefficient in applying his 
commitment to prevent violent attacks on Israelis from territories 
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under the PA’s full control. Indeed, Arafat’s primary concern was his 
image and reputation among the Palestinians. This meant that during 
times of sour relations with the Israeli government, Arafat acquiesced 
in the violence perpetrated by Hamas and other Islamic opposition 
groups or opted to buy time and peace with them at the expense of 
his commitments to Israel under the Cairo agreement of May 1994 to 
prevent terrorist attacks from the areas put under his control.40 Though 
Israeli intelligence and security officials were occasionally divided over 
the causes of this policy—objective inability or ill-will—it became the 
most effective argument employed by the critics of the Oslo Accords. 
As such, it was the main cause of the frustrated hopes and the loss of 
the PA’s credibility from the Israeli perspective. It may well be the case 
that Arafat perceived the continued Islamist terror attacks on Israel as 
a necessary pressure despite its detrimental domestic implications on 
the PA.
Especially under the impact of the terrorist attacks and the PA’s 
perceived acquiescence or inadequacy in fighting them, Israeli critics 
of the Oslo process repeatedly pointed to the incendiary nature of the 
PA’s media and official statements as an indication that the PLO’s stra-
tegic objective to eliminate Israel had remained unchanged. A case in 
point was the repeated Israeli demand that the PLO revoke those arti-
cles in its Charter that had tacitly or clearly denied Israel’s right to exist 
(as stipulated in the interim agreement of September 1995). This was 
even after the Palestinian National Council (PNC) had approved that 
changes would be made to the Charter (on 24 April 1996) without speci-
fying which of the 33 articles in the document would be changed.41 Fol-
lowing Netanyahu’s renewed pressures at the Wye summit, President 
Clinton visited Gaza in mid-December 1998 and attended the PNC 
session to ensure that the Charter was definitely revoked in accordance 
with Israel’s demand.42
The perceived nature of a hostile Palestinian media culminated in 
the heyday of the al-Aqsa Intifada as a direct result of the competition 
with Hamas and an increasingly militant and revolutionary discourse 
within the PA’s media, tacitly questioning the very legitimacy of the 
state of Israel. Already during Netanyahu’s term, senior Fatah officials 
made repeated statements to Palestinian audiences that explicitly or 
implicitly indicated an intention to return to the armed struggle. Some 
continued to use the slogan, “Revolution until Victory,” Fatah’s offi-
cial battle cry. The tension between raison d’etat and raison de la nation, 
termed by a Palestinian scholar as “national schizophrenia,”43 was 
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mitigated during the al-Aqsa Intifada, underscoring that Fatah’s revo-
lutionary and combatant spirit was still alive. Indeed, Arafat himself 
made no clear statement to the effect that the “revolution” was over 
and that the time had come to focus on building the Palestinian state 
and silence opposing messages by Fatah’s senior figures.44
Finally, the political economy of the PA indicated a clear preference 
for building regime security. It employed a number of armed organiza-
tions of police, intelligence, and preventive security, the overall person-
nel of which totaled more than 40,000 men. Whether this was part of 
Arafat’s centralized political economy ensuring the PA’s status as the 
primary employer or was genuinely needed for security purposes, 
Israeli right-wing figures repeatedly pointed to the dangerous inflation 
of Palestinian military forces, suggesting that its only rationale could 
be to prepare for confrontation with Israel. With the Tunnel clashes 
between armed PA personnel and IDF soldiers still freshly in mind, 
the Netanyahu government insisted on a substantial reduction of these 
forces and the arrest of those individuals wanted by Israel.45 This was 
rejected by Arafat. The debilitating impact of Israeli security and eco-
nomic policies on the deteriorating Palestinian economy notwithstand-
ing, the PA became identified with corruption, nepotism, and a lack 
of accountability and transparency in employing financial resources 
(mostly received from international donors). All this, of course, exacer-
bated the negative impressions concerning the PA and its institutional 
relevance.46
The Israeli grievances over the PA’s lack of enforcement of security 
measures, the continued incitement to violence in its media, and the 
failure to abolish the Charter’s articles denying Israel’s right to exist 
all were brought by Israeli PM Netanyahu to the fore at the Wye sum-
mit held in October 1998. While the Palestinian agenda was topped by 
claims for further redeployment in the West Bank, release of Palestin-
ian “security” prisoners, and opening the Palestinian airport in Rafah, 
Israel sought to reduce to a minimum its response to these demands 
and render its response conditional on Palestinian fulfillment of their 
commitments. Primary among Israel’s goals were the collection and 
control of illegal weapons, the prevention of incitement to violence, 
and a change of the PLO Charter.
The Wye agreement indeed contained a detailed security chapter. 
The Palestinian side agreed to take all measures to prevent acts of 
terrorism, crime, and hostilities directed against the Israeli side. Both 
parties agreed to stop incitement to violence. The U.S., Israel, and the 
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PA agreed to establish a trilateral committee to deal with the imple-
mentation of the chapter on security and the prevention of incitement. 
However, although Israel did fulfill a limited military redeployment, 
the process soon stalled due to strong opposition within the Israeli 
government to the compromises made by Netanyahu at Wye, herald-
ing the collapse of his coalition.
V. Exogenous Factors
A. The Politics of Identity
Historically, the Arab-Jewish conflict has been marked by divided 
identities within and across national borders and sovereignties, 
underpinning continued tensions concerning power and legitimacy. 
Both Israeli Jews and Palestinians are part of larger collective iden-
tity groups defined as the Jewish people and the pan-Arab nation. In 
both cases diasporic groups and larger identities tend to be involved 
in shaping the politics, identity, and legitimacy, thus entangling poli-
cymaking processes and consensus making. Hence, as Edward Said 
lamented, the signing of the Oslo Accords came without consulting the 
Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan who had vested interests 
in the agreements with Israel. Similarly, militant Jewish groups in the 
United States defied the Israeli government’s willingness to surrender 
parts of the Jewish homeland and Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem 
at large.47
The conquest of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip 
in the 1967 War brought all of historic Palestine under Israeli sovereign 
authority, rejuvenating old and new longings for Biblical Israel, and 
sowing the seeds of a messianic national-religious vision. Yet, while 
East Jerusalem was immediately annexed by the state of Israel, demo-
graphical reasons forced Israeli policymakers to leave the future of the 
occupied territories open, while effectively adopting a policy of selec-
tive settlement in them and establishing new “facts on the ground.” 
The future of the occupied territories soon became the single most 
important issue defining left and right and shaping Israeli politics. 
The impact of Israel’s reign over the West Bank and Gaza Strip was 
especially overt in the case of the National-Religious movement—an 
historical ally of the Labor movement. In the late 1970s, the National 
Religious Party (NRP) underwent a gradual shift toward militant, mes-
sianic nationalism, as indicated primarily by the continuous effort to 
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settle Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza region. Together with the secular 
nationalist Likud Party, the NRP aimed at preventing any future ter-
ritorial compromise.
These ideological differences notwithstanding, effectively the pol-
icies conducted by all Israeli governments since 1967, of both Left 
(Labor) and Right (Likud), on the issue of settlement were essentially 
supportive of the settlers, motivated by a mixture of domestic politics 
and traditional Zionist visions, on the one hand, and the failure to con-
sider the Palestinians as a national collective, on the other hand. Thus, 
despite the image of a deep cleavage between the pragmatic Labor 
Party and the nationalist groups eager to settle as many Jews as possi-
ble in the West Bank, the steady increase of the scope of settlements in 
the occupied territories reflected cooperation and symbiosis between 
the state and its various civil and security agencies and the settlers.48
The peace process that followed the Yom Kippur War boosted these 
processes of polarization in the Israeli-Jewish constituency, which came 
to suffer from political paralysis due to the balance between left and 
right, thus blocking any realistic option of a settlement over these ter-
ritories, including with King Hussein of Jordan.49 The shifting reins of 
power between the two main blocs notwithstanding, their equal elec-
toral power until the late 1990s turned any decision in favor of a major 
territorial compromise over these parts of Eretz Israel into a prescrip-
tion for political suicide. Indeed, the consecutive shifts of government 
led by the left and right in the Oslo years have underlined the narrow 
room for maneuver of Israeli governments, especially under condi-
tions of violence conducted by the Palestinians.
Despite his previous unequivocal and fierce opposition to the Oslo 
Accords, in view of the stable majority of support for the Oslo process 
among Israelis, Netanyahu had to adopt a compromise position. He 
suggested that his party would recognize the facts resulting from the 
Oslo Accords. Henceforth, the debate would revolve around the future 
of permanent settlements rather than on the already existing agree-
ment. In practice, he did not conceal his loathing of the Oslo Accords 
as detrimental to Israel. He made continuous efforts to control Israel’s 
losses by procrastinating on the implementation of its commitments. 
This approach, coupled with imposing increasingly restrictive security 
measures on Palestinian daily life and economic activities, eroded the 
political posture of Arafat and his mainstream Fatah movement within 
their own constituency and validated the Islamic opposition’s claims 
against any deal with Israel.50
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The ideological polarization in Israeli society and politics was repre-
sented by the pervasive employment by right-wing leaders of symbols 
and values defining Jewish collective identity in its antagonistic and 
secluded nature. In their campaign against the Oslo process, the right 
wingers showed little or no restraint, employing images of PM Rabin 
wearing a coufiyya, the traditional Arab headgear worn by Arafat; asso-
ciating the peace process with the Holocaust; and turning a blind eye 
to extremists presenting PM Rabin’s image dressed in a Nazi uniform; 
parallel to pointing to Arafat and his lieutenants as untrustworthy 
thugs. While the Rabin-Peres government emphasized its commitment 
to security in the context of securing the Jewish—and democratic—
character of the state of Israel, the nationalist-religious groups focused 
on the security of the “Whole Land of Israel” and the “People of Israel” 
as indivisible, emanating from God’s promise to his people.51
The discourse of the 1990s demonstrated the crucial power of val-
ues and taboos, and the debilitating effect of “non-Jewish” conduct, 
such as collaborating with Arafat and arming his cohorts, partitioning 
Jerusalem, compromising control over the Temple Mount, and freezing 
the construction of (or removing) settlements, even if “illegally” con-
structed. Indeed, since the late 1980s, the perceived threat to the Jew-
ish majority within historic Palestine (including Israeli Arab citizens) 
was due to the rapid natural population growth of the Palestinians. It 
became crucial in shaping public opinion and policymaking alike.52
This factor was apparently sufficient to mobilize most Israelis to 
support the total disengagement, including the uprooting of the Jew-
ish settlements—unprecedented in Israel’s history since 1967—from 
the Gaza Strip in August 2005. Yet slashing 1.4 million Palestinians 
from the demographic equation affected by the disengagement from 
Gaza Strip has apparently reduced the acuteness of this problem and 
its impact on policymaking regarding the West Bank. Nonetheless, on 
his return from the Annapolis Conference (November 2007), Israeli PM 
Olmert stated that failure to negotiate a two-state solution with the 
Palestinians would spell the end of the state of Israel. He warned of a 
“South African-style struggle,” which Israel would lose if a Palestinian 
state was not established.53 At the same time, since the disengagement 
from the Gaza Strip, right-wing groups have been waging a campaign 
aimed at proving that the demographic balance in fact tips in favor of 
the Jewish side, mainly due to decreasing fertility and growing emi-
gration among the Palestinians and, at the same time, increasing fertil-
ity of the Jewish population.54
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B. Supra-Nationalism and Regional Linkages
A significant exogenous factor affecting Israeli policymaking concern-
ing the Palestinians is the linkage with, and question of, prioritiz-
ing peacemaking with the Palestinians or with the neighboring Arab 
states. Historically, the Zionist movement and the state of Israel priori-
tized peace with the neighboring Arab rulers over the Arab-Palestin-
ian leadership, primarily due to practical considerations. As the most 
immediately concerned party, the Palestinians were seen as an utterly 
intransigent opponent and, despite ongoing contacts on tactical mat-
ters and one official attempt at reaching an agreement with their lead-
ers, the Zionist leadership preferred to approach the neighboring Arab 
rulers on matters of cooperation.
The establishment of the PLO in 1964 and the consequent systematic 
guerrilla war against Israel by Palestinian armed organizations—in 
the name of liberating Palestine as a whole and eliminating the state of 
Israel—defined the PLO as Israel’s sworn enemy. The conquest of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 provided Israel with direct access 
to Palestinian notables in these territories, but this leadership lacked 
the necessary legitimacy to enter into independent negotiations with 
Israel, especially under the PLO’s prohibition and threat of violent 
punishment against violating its exclusive authority. It was only in 
May 1989 that the national coalition government, with Y. Shamir as 
Prime Minister and S. Peres and Y. Rabin as Foreign and Defense Min-
isters, respectively, defined the Palestinians—albeit confined to the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip—as Israel’s main partner for a peaceful 
settlement over these territories.55
Nonetheless, the built-in difficulties of reaching a settlement with 
the Palestinians (let alone its implementation) have repeatedly tempted 
Israeli leaders since the International Madrid Conference (1991) to seek 
a quick breakthrough with an Arab state (Jordan, Syria, or Lebanon). 
Such attempts raised concerns among Palestinian policymakers lest 
Israel was seeking to prolong negotiations with them or shore up its 
bargaining position with them through securing its interests toward 
a third party. A salient example is PM Ehud Barak’s efforts to reach 
an agreement with Syria over the Golan Heights and Lebanon (May 
1999–March 2000) while holding back the fulfillment of Israel’s com-
mitment to cede another territory to the full responsibility of the Pales-
tinian Authority.56
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Regardless of Israel’s priorities, promoting Israeli-Arab peace rela-
tions has been, in theory and practice, dependent on progress in the 
Israeli-Palestinian track. Indeed, the Oslo process revealed the crucial 
role of the Palestine cause in Arab-Muslim states and societies. That 
breakthrough encouraged many Arab states to establish diplomatic 
relations with Israel or at least abandon their traditional policy of dip-
lomatic boycott against the Jewish state. Similarly, however, the erup-
tion of the al-Aqsa Intifada forced all Arab states to cease normalization 
of their relations with Israel or cut off diplomatic relations with it. In 
the absence of institutional legitimacy, continued economic depres-
sion, and dysfunctional bureaucracies, Arab regimes must reckon with 
public opinion, which in the recent two decades has been primarily 
shaped by the Islamist movements. The impact of growing Islamist 
activism was especially apparent in defying the Arab-Israeli peace pro-
cess through systematic public campaigns against normalization, thus 
emptying the peace treaties signed with Israel of their contents.57
Despite the PLO’s impressive diplomatic achievements since its 
establishment in 1964, the competitions among Arab states offered 
the rival Palestinian factions myriad opportunities for asylum, finan-
cial, military, and political support in their struggle against Israel. In 
the long run, these networks of patronage turned into a permanent 
phenomenon in the regional Arab-Israeli conflict, serving Palestinian 
opposition groups and their Arab patrons. Thanks to Libyan, Iraqi, 
Syrian and—as of the early 1990s—Iranian patronage, Palestinian ter-
rorist and “rejectionist” groups could play the role of spoilers of the 
peace effort by strategies ranging from exacerbating terrorist attacks 
against Israel to intra-Palestinian terrorism.
The main result of these processes in the Palestinian sphere was 
the emergence of the Islamic faction Hamas as the main opposition 
to the PLO and, since 1994, the Palestinian Authority. Without ignor-
ing the significance of Hamas as a social movement and its practical 
role in this respect, it is largely thanks to Iran’s generous financial aid 
and Syria’s political and military offices that this movement has been 
able to flourish and build a broad popular base. It defeated Fatah both 
politically, winning the elections to the PA Legislative Council in Janu-
ary 2006, and militarily in June 2007, assuming a ruling position in the 
Gaza Strip and threatening Fatah’s primacy in the West Bank.
In summary, both Israeli and Palestinian communities are stifled 
by contradictory systems of beliefs—and identities defined primar-
ily along a religious-secular dichotomy—but also by competing struc-
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tures and actors, both within and outside their immediate territorial 
boundaries. The impact of this web of identities and parallel regional 
networks of state and non-state actors on the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process is hard to exaggerate, especially given the Iranian and Syrian 
motivations and the interactions with U.S. policies in the region, espe-
cially its war on Iraq. No less important, given Iran’s overt call for the 
destruction of Israel and uncertainty about its nuclear project, Israeli 
perceptions of, and responses to, Islamic Palestinian violence tend to 
assume a broader regional context of security.58
V. Israel and the al-Aqsa Intifada
The failure of the Camp David summit was by no means the end 
of Israeli-PLO negotiations, which continued until the termination of 
Clinton’s administration in January 2001. Further international attempts 
to continue negotiations were made, primarily Clinton’s final propos-
als.59 However, with the escalation of violence beginning on 29 Sep-
tember 2000, the prospects for finalizing a full-blown agreement faded 
quickly despite the narrowed gaps between Israel and the PLO. Due to 
Arafat’s reservations, disagreements remained unresolved, especially 
concerning Israel’s claims to the Western Wall in Jerusalem as part of 
the Temple Mount compound, and the Palestinian refugees—the two 
most contentious issues. Similarly to PM Barak, Ambassador Ross, the 
senior American mediator in the Oslo process, maintains that, “Arafat 
was not up to peacemaking.”60
The scope of violence adopted by Palestinians and Israelis in 2001–
2004 was unprecedented in the history of their conflict, primarily in 
terms of human losses. During this period, the Palestinians carried out 
more than 20,000 attacks of various types, in which more than 1,000 
Israelis were killed (70% of whom were civilians), and more than 5,600 
were wounded. More than 500 Israelis were killed in suicide bomb-
ings, most of them civilians within the Green Line. The year 2002 was 
a record high, with 60 suicide bombings.61 From the beginning of the 
al-Aqsa Intifada in late September 2000 to the end of March 2002, 556 
Israeli civilians were killed.
The terrorist attacks had a far-reaching direct impact on civilians, as 
well as indirectly, defined in terms of high levels of post-traumatic anx-
iety and depression. The terrorist attacks were experienced by some 
as an existential anxiety.62 The main implication of these attacks was 
represented by growing militant perceptions and support of decisive 
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responses against the Palestinians.63 More specifically, and in view of 
the inefficacy of the diplomatic means, the Israeli public demonstrated 
a growing support for a military solution represented by the popular 
slogan, “Let the IDF Win!”
In the heyday of the al-Aqsa Intifada (October 2000–August 2003) 
most Israeli Jews experienced fear and anxiety, along with a sense of 
abandonment and hostility from the international community. In addi-
tion, despite the asymmetry of power relations with the Palestinians, 
many shared the view that while the prevailing perception is that “we 
are the Goliath and they are the David,” in actuality, the opposite was 
the case.64 Hence, while most Israelis perceived Operation Defense 
Shield (April 2002) as an inevitable act of defense against an unprec-
edented brutal wave of terror, world opinion by and large perceived 
Israel as an invader into sovereign Palestinian territory and as a vehe-
ment reverse of the Oslo process.65
Given the weakness of Israel’s political echelons, it was the military 
forces that dictated the parameters of the actual confrontation. The 
eruption of riots in late September 2000 was met by an unprecedented 
magnitude of fire power for which the IDF had been well prepared.66 
Indeed, during the first few weeks of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the toll of 
Israeli-to-Palestinian casualties was 1:20. Thus, despite statements by 
the military establishment to the contrary, it would seem that the IDF 
responded with excessive force, aiming to “decide the confrontation,” 
which escalated the violence by triggering a strong sense of vengeance 
among the Palestinians in an effort to straighten up this “blood bal-
ance.”67
Furthermore, while Mofaz, the IDF Chief of Staff during the first 
two years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, strove to dismantle the PA and expel 
Arafat from the territories, his successor, Ya’alon, preferred a strategy 
of accumulating pressure on the Palestinians that would exhaust their 
will to fight. In both cases, the government tended to follow the stra-
tegic outlines and operational recommendations of the Chief of Staff.68 
The military’s freedom of action was further promoted by the Israeli 
government’s decision shortly after the eruption of the riots, defining 
the violent events as an “armed conflict,” unlike policing activity. This 
meant a radical liberalization of the rules concerning opening fire, and 
a decreasing commitment of the legal system to see to the implementa-
tion of the rules.69
Despite the long bleeding conflict in the years of the al-Aqsa Inti-
fada, the parties were, by and large, left alone, even when Israel recap-
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tured the territories under PA jurisdiction. Underpinning this state of 
international paralysis was the Bush administration’s unprecedented 
support of Israel, perceiving it as part of the post-9/11 U.S. war on ter-
rorism. Hence, despite consequent visits of senior American officials 
and envoys in an effort to stop the violence, a resumption of negotia-
tions failed. When the idea of deploying international military forces 
in the Palestinian territories emerged in the course of Israel’s Defensive 
Shield as a means of stabilizing the conflict, Israel responded with all-
out rejection, perceiving it as detrimental to its freedom of action.70
The media played a destructive role in the implementation of the 
Oslo Accords. The impact of the media was discernible already dur-
ing the first Intifada. By inflating and exaggerating the significance of 
the events, it exacerbated violence that otherwise may not have taken 
place.71 A comparative study of the peace process of Oslo, Northern 
Ireland, and Israel-Jordan concluded that the media played a destruc-
tive role by its tendency to operate with competitive considerations 
and report immediately and dramatically, which ignored the vulner-
able, slow, and transitory nature of peacemaking processes.72
The vicious terrorist attacks by Palestinians in the al-Aqsa Inti-
fada played into the hands of those Israelis who had loathed the Oslo 
Accords or felt ambivalence toward the Palestinian leadership. It 
enabled the Israeli political and military echelons not only to place the 
responsibility for the collapse of the Oslo process on the Palestinian 
side, but also to explain the Palestinian violence as proof of Arafat’s 
unwillingness to accept the historical compromise offered by Israel. 
This line of argument, publicly propagated by PM Barak in the wake of 
the Camp David summit, meant to rally the Israeli public around the 
government and justify an anticipated long and costly confrontation 
with the Palestinians. Asserting Israel’s moral correctness in fighting 
the al-Aqsa Intifada, Chief of Staff Ya’alon typically defined the con-
frontation as an existential one: “[I]n terms of our righteousness [of 
policy], today I feel much more comfortable fighting what the Palestin-
ians create…[A]fter what we have been through in the last nine years, 
I have less question marks and more exclamation marks. For me, a 
moral clarity has been emerged.”73
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VI. Conclusion
The Oslo process demonstrated the rocky course to a historic Israeli-
Palestinian settlement as well as the immense cost of the frustrated 
expectations of the Palestinian people for statehood and sovereignty. 
It also underlined the resilience and blocking effect of symbolic assets 
and sacred values, even after agreeing on key principles and imple-
menting substantive military, political, and economic steps. The Oslo 
process shows that in spite of broad and intensive international diplo-
matic and financial efforts, local and regional factors played a primary 
role in shaping the conduct of policymakers and the pace, direction, 
and results of the process.
Neither the Israeli nor the Palestinian leadership has been equipped 
with sufficient legitimacy or political power to handle the core issues 
due to their “sacred” nature. Hence, the ambivalent and half-hearted 
approaches by policymakers are revealed, especially under conditions 
of uncertainty and delayed implementation of agreed-upon commit-
ments. Nothing attests more clearly to the Israeli and Palestinian con-
strained decision-making than the continued violence against Israelis 
on the part of the Palestinian opposition groups (with limited efforts by 
the Palestinian Authority to curb it) or the continued Israeli settlement 
in the West Bank and East Jerusalem throughout the years of the Oslo 
process. At the grassroots level, there has been no serious discourse on 
the core issues of the conflict and no effective attempts to educate the 
public about the painful concessions they would have to make in order 
to reach a settlement.
Under these circumstances, and aggravated by the huge gap in 
material capabilities between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as 
insufficient ripeness, a more determined international effort was nec-
essary to cut the Gordian Knot.
The story of the Oslo process is an account of Israel’s escalating 
resistance to conceding authority and control over the occupied ter-
ritories and East Jerusalem to an autonomous Palestinian Authority, 
on the one hand, and the Palestinians’ frustrated hopes for improved 
social and economic conditions, let alone a rapid development toward 
statehood and sovereignty, on the other. In retrospect, it seems that 
Israeli policymakers sought first and foremost to absolve themselves 
of the burden of directly governing the Palestinian population in the 
occupied territories and, with the PA’s help, substantially to reduce if 
not fully quell Palestinian violence originating from these areas.
Avraham Sela
133
Clinton and his aides were originally content with facilitation, rather 
than playing an assertive role and presenting their own proposals to 
the parties, forgoing the use of the clout of the single world power. 
When a proactive model was finally applied by Clinton, it turned 
out to be too little, too late. As to the Bush administration, despite its 
diplomatic efforts to resume the Oslo process, the “Road Map,” and 
its declared vision of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, it demon-
strated distance and passivity. Both administrations were overly sup-
portive of Israel and lacked sufficient commitment to see to a successful 
process. •
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